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De facto states operate against unfavorable international legal conditions, combined 
with manifest security threats and widespread political disengagement from the 
international community. Moreover, they are affected by a mix of economic sanctions 
and are forced into socio-cultural isolation. This leads to an enduring “do or die” 
dilemma where de facto states either seek protection from external patrons (“do”) or 
face the prospect of forceful reintegration back into their parent states (“die”). Patron-
client relations nevertheless come at a price. Although essential for de facto states’ 
survival, patron state involvement also constrains their independence, which in turn 
fuels the perception that they are simply extensions of their patron states, or puppets in 
power-plays between larger states.  
 
This memo discusses the “do or die” dilemma of post-Soviet de facto states. Our 
examination looks in to patron-client relations that are highly unequal and asymmetric 
in terms of resources and capabilities: Russia vis-à-vis Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and 
Transnistria, and Armenia vis-à-vis Nagorno-Karabakh. While relying entirely on a 
militarily and economically resourceful external patron is often seen as the only viable 
option, de facto states may be risking the loss of their “independence.” Hence their “do 
or die” dilemma that structures many of their policies. 
 
Strings-Attached Alignment 
 
De facto states’ strategic alliances with Russia have always been controversial. For 
example, from early on, Russia secured its domination over Abkhazia’s and South 
Ossetia’s economic and military sectors, provided passports and social allowances to its 
extraterritorial compatriots, enabled (limited) recognition, and tightened its grip over 
local politics. Russia played a major role in the cancellation of the 2011 presidential 
elections in South Ossetia when Alla Dzhioeva led the opposition and won. In Abkhazia, 
Russian influence in 2014 led to the ousting of the moderately pro-Russian president 
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Alexandr Ankvab by the fully pro-Russian Raul Khajimba. About 60-70 percent of 
Abkhazia’s and over 90 percent of South Ossetia’s state budgets are currently supplied 
by Russian transfers.2 Furthermore, Russian troops assist the de facto state authorities by 
guarding the Georgian border. Although recognizing these secessionist entities as 
independent countries in 2008, Russia today builds new roads and railways and carries 
out development programs as if these territories were integral parts of the Russian 
Federation.3 
 
Russia has signed treaties with the Georgian breakaway territories as a way to further 
integrate them. The treaties offer a coordinated foreign policy, a common space in 
military and socio-economic spheres, joint actions for combating organized crime, and 
harmonization of customs regulations, welfare services, and social services. The 2014 so-
called “treaty on alliance and strategic partnership” reflects the creation of supranational 
structures and Abkhazia’s clear subordination to Russia. The 2015 so-called “treaty on 
alliance and integration” envisages, among other aspects, the joint management of South 
Ossetian military forces and should be read as Russia effectively taking it upon itself to 
ensure complete control over the territory. 
 
In light of heightened tensions between the West and Russia over areas in their common 
neighborhood, and because of Georgia’s past use of force (such as the Kodori operation 
in 2006 and Operation Clear Field in 2008), both the Abkhazian and South Ossetian 
leadership have been eager to accept their Russian patron’s offer of implicit annexation. 
Although the treaties’ provisions have turned out to be more problematic than initially 
anticipated, and some locals have strongly opposed Russian conditions as a threat to 
self-proclaimed sovereignty, the same people are nevertheless wary of choosing the 
prospect of extreme economic hardship and insecurity over increased Russian 
dominance.  
 
Ambiguous Partnerships 
 
De facto states may approve strong links with their patron, yet the outcome of patron-
client relations might be somewhat more nuanced. Transnistria is an entity that firmly 
sets the maintenance of its ties with the “Russian World” as its policy goal and has 
repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to join the Russian Federation. Its most recent 
request was filed by the speaker of the Transnistrian parliament (which is officially 
called the Supreme Council of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic) following 
Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Russia, in return, supports the 
territorial integrity of Moldova provided that a “special status” is given to Transnistria 
with Russian military units positioned there to help to secure peace.  
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Russia’s financial support to Transnistria is consistent with its compatriot policies and is 
directed to ensure higher pensions and improvement of conditions at schools, 
kindergartens, hospitals, and other public institutions. Transnistria’s gas debt to Russia 
exceeds more than three times its own GDP (2011) and renders doubtful the continued 
viability of it as a de facto state. This heavy financial bondage gives the patron state 
opportunities to direct its client’s decision-making process. Russia’s role has been 
decisive in that region’s ongoing conflict dynamics; it has orchestrated peace-building 
projects and slowed down the pace of Moldova’s Europeanization within the European 
Neighborhood Policy framework.  
 
Although Moscow has played a crucial role in Transnistria’s survival as a de facto state, 
it has gained some economic advantages independently. Transnistria is the only post-
Soviet de facto state that has been included in trade agreements with the EU (DCFTA) 
through its parent state, Moldova. As a result, Transnistria is able to export its products 
to Western Europe—to such an extent that this trade revenue is now dominant. While 
Russia dominates Transnistrian imports (mainly due to reliance on Russian gas), its 
exports to Russia were only 8 percent (2015) with 49 percent going to Moldova and 32 
percent going to the EU. This arrangement means that Russia has not yet fully extended 
its patronage of Transnistria. One of the reasons for this is arguably that, unlike 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Transnistria does not have a joint border with Russia, 
which seems unwilling to create another Kaliningrad, and is dependent on Moldova for 
continued access to Transnistrian territory (and on Ukraine, though to a decreased 
degree after 2014).  
 
In contrast, Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia function very much as a single space. 
Because Nagorno-Karabakh is landlocked between its patron (Armenia) and parent 
(Azerbaijan) states, the only way that residents can connect with the outside world is 
through Armenia. Armenia’s contribution to Nagorno-Karabakh’s budget (2016) has 
reached as much as 58 percent of total expenditure. Within the security context, its 
dependence on Armenia is remarkable, though the actual depth and types of 
involvement are unclear. A 2008 research paper claimed that at that time more than half 
of the 20,000 strong “Karabakh force” was comprised of “proper Armenians.” Other 
reports point out that its army maintains a separate operational command, and 
President Vladimir Putin’s decree on November 14, 2016, on the creation of a Russian-
Armenian joint military force, pointedly excludes Nagorno-Karabakh units. Although 
there has been a push for independence within the territory in recent years, some see 
this as an intermediary step before a possible joining with Armenia at a later date. This 
push is based on opinion polls conducted in the territory that show a 35 to 49 percent 
rise in support for Karabakh’s independence between 2015 and 2016, especially among 
younger and slightly higher income groups, and 51 percent of those questioned in July 
2016 (two months after the war that April) felt that Armenia should recognize Nagorno-
Karabakh’s independence. 
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The Armenian diaspora has played an equally important role in increasing Nagorno-
Karabakh’s viability by helping to reduce its dependence on financial support of the 
Armenian state. Largely thanks to the diaspora, the de facto state authorities have, over 
the years, gained access to high-level politicians in the United States and Europe. In 
March 2018, Nagorno-Karabakh’s president, Bako Sahakyan, managed to gain a visa to 
the United States and visited Washington. It is perhaps the most successful of the post-
Soviet de facto states in this regard. Locally, a so-called “Karabakh clan” has strong ties 
to the Armenian body politic and its actors have reached high political posts in Yerevan. 
It is unclear whether these political elites have provided any direct benefits for Nagorno-
Karabakh, but it was arguably the perception of former President Robert Kocharian 
representing both Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh simultaneously that led to the 
exclusion of the latter from the OSCE-chaired peace negotiations in 1998. 
 
Conclusion: Power of the Powerless 
 
Generally, the main drivers of a patron-client relationship are ideological convergence, 
international solidarity, and strategic advantages. Here, we can distinguish between 
Armenia, which supports Nagorno-Karabakh because they are seen as forming a 
culturally and economically uniform space, and Russia, where any traditional 
allegiances with its de facto states have been transformed by geostrategic context. 
(Russia had kinship with Transnistria and Donbas but not with Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, which are not ethnic Russian regions.) As such, Russia is strengthening and 
expanding its “Russia World” civilizational realm in these areas.  
 
Supporting de facto states offers Moscow considerable strategic advantages in its quest 
to counter the prevailing Western hegemony that emerged after the Cold War and 
which does not take into account Russia’s interests in its perceived spheres of influence. 
When Russia supported military insurgents against Georgia’s central authorities at the 
beginning of the 1990s, it was to deliberately assert Moscow’s stakes throughout the 
post-Soviet space. When it decided to recognize South Ossetian and Abkhazian 
independence in 2008, it was less driven by sympathy for the self-determination of these 
populations and more by the strategic calculation that this policy would undermine 
Georgia’s opportunity to eventually become a NATO member. (Moscow-backed 
security forces have repeatedly moved the South Ossetian administrative boundary line 
a few hundred meters into Georgia, leading to a segment of the BP-operated Baku–
Supsa pipeline to now be inside the occupied territory.) At the same time, Russia seems 
to be in no hurry to annex Transnistria, as long as Moldova stays undecided on its 
geopolitical orientation. 
 
Post-Soviet de facto states are small in size, however, due to their geographical location 
and the stakes involved, these territories hold considerable power as custodians of 
geopolitical fault lines and they have the potential to disrupt the strategic balance of the 
entire region and even the international system. To be sure, this is also the same power 
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that these entities try to leverage in exchange for their patron’s military and economic 
support. This, paradoxically, leads them toward their “do or die” dilemma, rendering 
them almost powerless within their patron-client relationship because any alternative 
foreign policy directions are subsequently sharply constrained. This helplessness raises 
recurring questions about the true feasibility of their independent, albeit de facto, 
statehood. Their “do or die” dilemma may not necessarily be enduring, because both 
reintegration with their parent state or incorporation into their patron state refers to the 
“end game.” Still, the power of the powerless depends on their capabilities and 
perceptions on how further engagement and internal resistance to subjugation might be 
beneficial or harmful for them in the long run. 
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